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Abstract 
Recently, Saxena and Soh presented one novel cryptographic primitive based on associative one-way functions, 
called oracle-based group with infeasible inversion (O-GII), and it requires the order of group is hidden. In this paper, 
we propose three ID-based cryptographic schemes, such as ID-based non-interactive key sharing (ID-NIKS) scheme, 
hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, and ID-based signature (IBS) scheme, based on hidden-order 
groups. We say that the security proof of our proposed schemes is an open problem. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction  
Identity-based cryptograhy (IBC) [16,3] is a public key cryptography which the public key can be an 
arbitrary string, such as the recipient’s email address. The user’s private key is generated by a trusted 
authority, called the private key generator (PKG), which applies its master key to the user’s identity after 
the user authenticates itself. Shamir [16] gave the notion of IBC for simplifying public key and the 
certificate management and proposed the first ID-based signature (IBS) scheme. However, it is not until 
much later that Boneh and Franklin [3] presented the first secure and truly practical ID-based encryption 
(IBE) scheme. And they proved its security in the random oracle model [1]. Subsequently, many practical 
IBC, including IBS [5,6], (H)IBE [2,17,6], and ID-based key distribution [10,6] etc., are proposed.  
There are several classes of existing IBC based on different assumptions and mathematic tools. Some 
of them are based on groups with a bilinear map [3,8,6,14]; some of them are based on quadratic 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-152-8010-2192. Fax: +86-591-2286-8115 
E-mail address: cllin@fjnu.edu.cn. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
2068  Chanlgu Lin / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 2067 – 2071 Author name / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
residuosity problem modulo a composite [7,4]; others are based on hard problems on lattices [9,11]. 
Recently, Saxena and Soh [15] presented a new cryptographic primitive, called an oracle-based group 
with infeasible inversion (O-GII), which is a strong associative one-way function (SAOWF) along with an 
oracle allowing verifiable computation, and proposed a practical one round key agreement protocol for 
arbitrary size groups. In addition, they pointed out that this cryptographic primitive can be used to design 
IBC and proposed the IBE scheme based on hidden-order groups. However, they claimed that the security 
proof of this proposed IBE scheme is an open problem. In this paper, we do not focus on the security of 
IBC and pay our attentions on how to construct some ID-based cryptographic schemes based on hidden-
order groups, that is, oracle-based group with infeasible inversion problem. We propose ID-based non-
interactive key sharing (ID-NIKS) scheme, hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, and ID-
based signature (IBS) scheme, based on hidden-order groups. 
2. Preliminaries 
We only describe the group inversion problem (GIP) for the oracle-based group with infeasible 
inversion (O-GII). For more information about strong associative one-way functions (O-SAOWFs) and 
group with infeasible inversion (GII), the readers are referred to [15]. 
Definition 1 (O-GII [15]). A black-box construction of a SAOWF implemented with a PV-Oracle, O , is 
called an Oracle-GII (O-GII). Concretely, an O-GII construction has three PPT algorithms: Setup,
Sample, and Compute.
Group Inversion Problem (GIP). We say that a PPT algorithm A  breaks the O-GII if it is able to 
“invert” the O-GII and compute inverse in G  by having only black-box access to the Compute algorithm. 
We call this as the group inversion problem (GIP). Formally, the advantage of A  in solving GIP is 
defined as: 
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Definition 2 (GIP [15]). We say that algorithm ( ), ,δ εOA K -breaks the O-GII f  if A  runs at most 
timeδ ; makes at most OK adaptive queries to the oracle O  by implementing the Compute algorithm; and 
( )GIPAdv τA  is at leastε . Alternatively, we say that the O-GII is ( ), ,δ εOK -secure under an adaptive 
attack if no such algorithm A  exists.
Remark 1.  1) GII must have hidden order for the group. Since the group G  is of finite order, the only 
way to achieve non-invertibility is to keep the order of this group hidden; 2) the definitions for IBC are 
referred to [3, 6]. 
3. Three ID-based Cryptographic Schemes 
In the following three subsections, we propose ID-based non-interactive key sharing (ID-NIKS) 
scheme, hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, and ID-based signature (IBS) scheme, based 
on hidden-order groups (group inversion problem ). 
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3.1 ID-based Non-interactive Key Sharing (ID-INSK) Scheme 
There are three algorithms for the ID-based non-interactive key sharing (ID-INSK) scheme, that are, 
setup algorithm, key generation algorithm and shared key algorithm, denoted by Setup-NIKS, KeyGen 
and SharedKey, respectively. The detailed descriptions of them are as follows. 
·Setup-NIKS: 1. Set ( )( , ), ( , ) ;X Y RX Yσ σ ← Sample params  2. Let { }*1 : 0,1 nH → Z  and 
{ }2 : 0,1 kH →G  be two cryptographic hash functions. The system parameters par and the master key m-
key are as follows respectively: par ={ }1 2, , ,Y Z H H , m-key ={ },X Yσ σ .
·KeyGen:  Let { }*0,1id ∈ be the identity bit string. 1. Set 1( ) ni H id= ∈Z ; 2. 
Compute ( , , ) iX i Y X Yσ −− = ∈,  G�. So the private key is prv-key iid X Y−= ∈ G .
·SharedKey: Given the system parameter par, the private key prv-key
Aid
and the identity Bid of B,
where A Bid id≠ , do: 1. Set 1( )A Ai H id=  and 1( )B Bi H id= ; 2. 
Compute -i, 2 2
ˆ( ( ( - , ), ( , ))) (X ).A B A B
A
i i i
A B id B AK H i Y i H Yε ε += =prv key' 
It is easy to compute that -i, 2 2
ˆ( ( ( - , ), ( , ))) (X ).A B A B
B
i i i
B A id A BK H i Y i H Yε ε += =prv key'   This implies 
that the entities A and B can compute a common secret key without interactive any information each other 
expect for only using the public identity.  
3.2 Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption Scheme 
In IBE scheme, there is a single PKG which should verify the identity and establish secure channels to 
transfer user’s private keys. However, it may be a bottleneck in a large network. Hierarchical ID-based 
encryption (HIBE) setups a several levels of PKGs and the root PKG delegates to generate the private key 
and only verify the identity for the lower-level PKGs. The advantage of HIBE is that the authentication 
and transmission of private key can be done locally. Here, we propose a HIBE is based on hidden-order 
groups. There are four algorithms as follows: 
·Setup-HIBE: 1. Set ( )
0 0
0 0
( , ), ( , ) ;
X Y R
X Yσ σ ← Sample params  2. Compute 
00 0 0 0
( ,1, ) ;XZ Y X Yσ← =,  3. Let { }*1 : 0,1 nH → Z and { }2 : 0,1 kH →G  be two cryptographic hash 
functions. They are treated as random oracles in the security analysis. The system parameters par and the 
master key m-key are as follows respectively:  par ={ }0 0 1 2, , ,Y Z H H , m-key = { }0 0,X Yσ σ .
·KeyGen: Let *1( ,..., ) {0,1}t tID I I= ∈ be the identity string of depth t  for 1t ≥ . The corresponding 
private key td can be generated by giving the parent identity 1 1 1( ,..., )t tID I I− −=  and the corresponding 
private key 1td − . If t = 1, then do as follows: 1. Compute 1 1 1( ) ;ni H I= ∈Z  2. Compute 
1
01 1 0 0 0
( , , ) .iXd i Y X Yσ −= − =,   If 2t ≥ , then do as follows: 3. Compute 1 1( ,..., ) ;t t ni H I I= ∈Z  4. Set 
( )
1 11 1
( , ), ( , ) ,
t tt X t Y R
X Yσ σ
− −− − ← Sample params then 1 1σ σ− −− t tt ti iX Y is the sample information for 1 1.t ti it tX Y−− − 5. 
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Compute 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1
( ,1, ) X ( );j jt t t t
t t
i ii i i i i t
t X Y t t t t j j jd d X Y d Y X Yσ σ− −
−− − −
− − − − = − −= = = ∏� � � � � �  6. Compute 
1
1
1 1 1 1( , 1, ) .tt Y t t tZ X Y Xσ − −− − − −= − =� �
·HID-Encrypt: To encrypt a message { }0,1 km∈ for 2log ( )k n< using the identity 1( ,..., )t tID I I= , do as 
follows: 1. Compute 1 1( ,..., ) ,j j ni H I I= ∈Z  for 1,..., ;j t=  2. Generate ( )( , ) ;R RR σ ← Sample params  3. 
Compute 1 11 2 0 1 2 0( ( ,1, ( , 1))) ( );
i
RC m H Y i m H R Yσ ε += ⊕ + = ⊕� �  4. 
Compute 11 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1( ,1, ( , )) Z ( ) ( ),
l l li i iij j j
j R l l l l l l l lC Z i R R X Y X Yσ ε −= − = − = − −= ∏ = ∏ = ∏� � � � � � for 1,..., .j t=
Then, the ciphertext is 0 1 2( , , ,..., ).tC C C C C=
·HID-Decrypt: To decrypt the ciphertext 0 1 2( , , ,..., ),tC C C C C=  using the private key td , do as follows: 
1. Compute 1 1 1 10 0 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 0
ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .j jl l i ii ii i ij tt t l l l j j jD C d R X Y X Y X Y X Y R Y
−− − +
= − − = − −= = ∏ ∏ =O � � � � � � � � �  2. 
Then, the decrypted message is 1 2 ( ).m C H D= ⊕
3.3 ID-Based Signature Scheme 
The ID-based signature (IBS) scheme by using the O-GII includes the following four algorithms: 
·Setup: it does as the following steps. 1. Set ( )( , ), ( , )X Y RX Yσ σ ← Sample params ；2. Compute 
X( ,1, ) ;Z Y X Yσ← =� �  3. Let { }*1 : 0,1 nH → Z and { }2 : 0,1 nH →G  be two cryptographic hash 
functions. The system parameters par and the master key m-key are as follows respectively:  par
={ }1 2, , ,Y Z H H ，m-key ={ },X Yσ σ .
·KeyGen:  Let *{0,1}id ∈  be the identity bit string. 1. Set 1( ) ;ni H id= ∈Z  2. Compute 
X( , , ) .
ii Y X Yσ −− = ∈� � G� So the private key is - .−= iid X Yprv key �
·Sign:  Let *{0,1}M ∈  be the message. To sign M, a signer computes 2 ( ) nm H M= ∈Z  (we would have 
nm∈Z with overwhelming probability). The signer computes 
( - , ) ( ) .α ε − −← = =i m im mid m X Y X Yprv key � �  So, the signature of the signer on M is ( , , ).id M α
·Verify: To verify a signature ( , , )id M α  on message M, compute 1( )i H id=  and 2 ( ) nH M ∈Z  and then 
check that the equality ?( , ( 1) ) ( , ( , ))Y i m Z imε α ε+ = O  holds.  
The correct of the above signature can be guaranteed by the following equation 
( 1) ? ( ) ( ).i m im im m im imY Z X Y X Yα+ −= =� � � �
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we propose three ID-based cryptographic schemes, such as ID-based non-interactive key 
sharing (ID-NIKS) scheme, hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) scheme, and ID-based signature 
(IBS) scheme, based on hidden-order groups. Their security proofs are still an open problem. 
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